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C
Forewor d
The Government strategy on drugs, Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain,
emphasises the importance of tackling drug-dealing at the local level. This report
builds on an earlier PRC study of local drug markets, which examined the scope for
situational prevention methods for dealing with local drug markets – an approach
which has proved effective in dealing with more conventional local crime
problems.
Drawing on studies and evaluations from both the USA and Britain, this report
identifies six elements to successful initiatives aimed at disrupting local drug
markets. It also highlights the importance of effective co-operation between the
police and other agencies, supporting the emphasis on ‘partnership’ within the
Government strategy on drugs, and reinforcing the role of Drug Action Teams,
which have responsibility for co-ordinating action at a local level.
Gloria Laycock
Head of Policing and Reducing Crime Unit
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate
Home Office
March 1999
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Executive summar y
The subject of this report is the application of situational crime prevention
methods to the policing of local drug markets. In the context of the report, the
term ‘drug market’ is used to refer to a location at which illicit drugs (of one or
more kinds) are bought and sold; and ‘situational crime prevention’ refers to
measures taken by the police and other agencies to modify the social and physical
features of drug market sites in order to make them less attractive to dealers and
users.
The report considers four key themes relating to the situational policing of drug
markets. First, it discusses the necessity of identifying and analysing drug hot-
spots , as a first stage of any operation. The implementation of situational initiatives
is dependent upon thorough knowledge of the geographical locations and spread,
and the major social and environmental features, of the markets that are being
targeted. The data used for the purposes of mapping and analysis can derive from
many sources, including intelligence records, arrest and crime reports, emergency
calls for service and public surveys. 
Secondly, the relevance of police crackdowns to situational initiatives is
considered. Situational prevention is frequently undertaken by the police in
conjunction with locally-based enforcement initiatives. Low-level enforcement at
drug market locations can involve any combination of a number of elements which
inhibit drug transactions by increasing the risks of arrest and general inconvenience
faced by buyers and sellers. Enforcement strategies most commonly take the form of
covert surveillance, test-purchase operations, highly visible patrols, police raids,
and sweeps.
Thirdly, the report looks at the various strategies of place management which can
be employed in order to modify the environments of drug-dealing sites. These
strategies are most effectively carried out by the police in partnership with other
agencies operating in the local areas. Multi-agency action at drug market locations
can encompass a wide range of measures to tackle such problems as lack of
surveillance, weak management, the presence of potential customers for drug
dealers, and the presence of facilitators for buying and using drugs.
Finally, there is an examination of the potential problem of displacement.
Displacement is said to occur when a situational initiative at a drug market
location has the result of changing the patterns of, rather than eradicating, illegal
activity. Displacement may, however, have benign effects: as when a movement
from overt to covert dealing results in a reduction in forms of anti-social behaviour
associated with street-level markets. A reverse process to that of displacement can
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also be a consequence of situational initiatives: a ‘diffusion of benefits’ occurs when
the positive effects of a strategy have an impact upon an area or a form of crime
that was not directly targeted.
The themes outlined above are discussed with reference to the findings of a number
of studies of policing initiatives at drug market locations. These include an
assessment of a crime analysis programme used in New Bedford, Massachusetts, to
identify addresses at which there was repeated drug activity; a study of the effects of
New York City’s Tactical Narcotics Teams, which carried out short-term, intensive
narcotics enforcement in designated areas; and the case of Operation Welwyn: the
police contribution to a multi-agency crime prevention initiative in King’s Cross,
London. 
It is concluded from the literature reviewed by this report that there are six crucial
elements to successful multi-agency, preventive initiatives against local drug
markets:
• Appropriateness of intervention Analysis of a drug market site, prior to the 
design of a preventive strategy, should entail careful examination of the 
parameters and nature of the local problem. Consultation with residents and 
community groups can enhance sensitivity to any unique features of the site.
• Intensity of intervention The use of proactive enforcement tactics in 
combination with alternative methods of crime prevention permits the 
weaknesses of certain approaches to be counter-acted by the strengths of others.
• Leverage Situational policing of drug markets requires the creative use of levers 
by the police as they seek to persuade other agencies to work with them. In 
some cases, this will primarily be a matter of encouraging potential partners to 
recognise that they have common interests and goals. In other cases, the police 
may have to draw on civil laws and regulations in obliging place managers to 
take actions against drug dealers and users. 
• Sustained action The likelihood that the beneficial impact of many initiatives 
will be eroded over time must always be borne in mind. Preventive strategies 
should incorporate components that will have at least some long-term effects 
upon drug market sites, and should be sufficiently flexible to respond to 
changing patterns of behaviour among drug dealers and users.
• Sensitivity to community relations Crime control initiatives that exacerbate 
existing tensions within neighbourhoods may be counter-productive. When 
local residents and community organisations are involved in the development of
strategies, efforts should be made to incorporate representatives of as many 
segments of the population as possible.
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• Evaluation Thorough process evaluations of initiatives should bring to light 
design and implementation problems as and when they arise, and may therefore
assist with their resolution. Evaluations should also allow early mistakes to be 
avoided and achievements to be built upon in later phases of operations, and 
facilitate interchange concerning good practice between agencies and regions.
(vii)
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1. Introduction
Situational crime prevention
The term ‘situational crime prevention’ refers to measures taken by the police and
other agencies to reduce the opportunities for, and potential rewards of, crime
committed in specific places. These measures focus on the nature of criminal
events and the settings within which they occur, rather than on the motivations
and profiles of offenders. Hence this is a highly pragmatic approach, which ‘seeks
not to eliminate criminal or delinquent tendencies through improvement of society
or its institutions, but merely to make criminal actions less attractive to offenders’
(Clarke, 1997: 2). 
The rationale for situational methods arises from a recognition that criminal
activities of all kinds are not evenly distributed across towns, cities or regions, but
tend to cluster in particular localities. Crime statistics tell us that even within
neighbourhoods known for their high crime rates, substantial areas are likely to be
relatively free of crime, while certain places may be heavily exploited by offenders.
This simple fact informs the key hypothesis put forward by advocates of the
situational approach to crime prevention: namely, that ‘if we can prevent crime at
these high crime places, then we might be able to reduce total crime’ (Eck, 1997:
187).
The implementation of situational crime prevention measures involves the
identification and then modification of whatever physical and social features of
high-crime locations - or crime ‘hot-spots’ - encourage criminal activities. These
features can be many and varied, and may include, for example, a lack of formal or
informal surveillance, poor management, easy access, and the presence of
inadequately secured valuable items (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). In short, ‘crimes are
created by the interactions of potential offenders with potential targets in settings
that make doing the crime easy, safe and profitable’ (Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1995: 5).
Situational crime prevention techniques are generally applied to places which are
small in area: a given location may comprise no more than a single building or a
few addresses or street sections; at most, it may stretch to a block or housing estate.
Some situational initiatives may be oriented towards entire neighbourhoods or
communities, but the various components of such initiatives are likely to be
narrowly focused on specific localities within the wider area.
A vast range of strategies can be employed by the police and other agencies in the
effort to make high-crime locations less inviting to offenders; the chosen strategies
will depend, of course, on the specifics of the crimes committed and their settings.
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Clarke (1997) has proposed a model for situational prevention which incorporates
16 techniques of reducing opportunities for crime (see Table 1). These are classified
according to the four aims of: 
• increasing the effort associated with crime; 
• increasing the risks of crime; 
• reducing the rewards of crime; and 
• removing the excuses for crime.
The very earliest forms of crime prevention involved the modification of places in
order to make offences more difficult to commit (Eck, 1997). It is since the late
1970s, however, that situational crime prevention has become a focus of
criminological research, and has played an increasingly significant part in crime
control strategies in Britain and the USA.
Situational techniques have often been used as elements of a broader problem-
oriented policing (POP) strategy. Like the situational perspective, the POP model
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Table 1  16 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques
Increasing Perceived
Effor t
Increasing Perceived
Risks
Reducing Anticipated
Rewards
Removing Excuses
1. Target hardening
Fake coin rejector
devices
Steering locks
Anti-bandit screens
2. Access control
Parking lot barriers
Fenced yards
Entry phones
3. Deflecting offenders
Bus stop placement
Pub location
Street closure
4. Controlling
facilitators
Credit card photo
Gun controls
Caller-ID
5. Entry/exit screening
Automatic ticket
gates
Baggage screening
Merchandise tags
6. Formal surveillance
‘Red light’ cameras
Burglar alarms
Security guards
7. Surveillance by
employees
Pay phone location
Park attendants
CCTV systems
8. Natural surveillance
Defensible space
Street lighting
Cab driver ID
9. Target removal
Removable car radio
Women’s refuges
Phonecard
10. Identifying property
Property marking
Vehicle licensing
Cattle branding
11. Reducing
temptation
G e n d e r-neutral listings
in telephone dire c t o r i e s
Off-street parking
Rapid repair
12. Denying benefits
Ink merchandise tags
PIN for car radios
Graffiti cleaning
13. Rule setting
Customs declaration
Harassment codes
Hotel registration
14. Stimulating
conscience
Roadside speedometers
‘Shoplifting is stealing’
‘Idiots drink and drive’
15 Controlling
disinhibitors
Drinking-age laws
Ignition interlock
‘V-chip’ for TV sets
16. Facilitating
compliance
Easy library checkout
Public lavatories
Litter bins
Adapted from Clarke (1997)
has had considerable influence over the past two decades, particularly in the USA.
It is associated above all with the work of Goldstein (1979, 1990; see also Leigh et
al, 1996). Whereas the traditional police response to incidents has been to deal
with the symptom but not to tackle the underlying causes, the basic idea of POP is
that policing should be refocused on the cause. POP involves a rational, problem-
solving approach, and has significant implications for police organisation and
management. It involves four key stages: 
• scanning, or recognition of the problem; 
• analysis , whereby the causes and extent of the problem are explored, and the
key actors identified; 
• response , the nature and scope of which will be determined by the nature and 
scope of the problem; 
• assessment , which must be carried out in a comprehensive manner if new 
problem-solving initiatives are to build on previous successes. 
Situational policing and local drug markets
This report examines the application of situational crime prevention methods to
the policing of drug markets. The term ‘drug market’ is used here to refer to a
location at which illicit drugs (of one or more kinds) are bought and sold; and
‘situational crime prevention’ refers, following the above discussion, to efforts to
modify the social and physical features of drug market locations in order to make
them less attractive to dealers and users. The importance of tackling drug-dealing
at a local level is highlighted by two of the four aims of the new Government
strategy on drugs, Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain (1998): to ‘protect our
communities from drug-related anti-social and criminal behaviour’ and to ‘stifle the
availability of illegal drugs on our streets’.
The police frequently undertake situational prevention in conjunction with locally-
based enforcement initiatives. Operations which combine situational crime
prevention with what is often referred to as ‘low-level enforcement’ (see, for
example, Lee, 1995) have sometimes followed dissatisfaction with the expense and
seemingly poor results of attempts to disrupt wholesale trafficking (Uchida and
Forst, 1994). While several agencies may be involved in implementing situational
strategies against drug-dealing, the police usually take the lead role in these, and
responsibility for the co-ordination of multi-agency activities.
Drug-dealing is not always carried out in fixed locations: where markets are ‘closed’,
that is, confined to participants who are known to each other, dealing can occur at
any convenient place. On the other hand, ‘open’ markets, which are accessible to
INTRODUCTION
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all potential customers, tend to be place specific (Edmunds et al, 1996). Eck (1995)
describes the dilemma faced by retail buyers and sellers in illicit markets who
recognise that they face fewer risks of being cheated or of being apprehended by
the police if they deal only with people they know, but would welcome the far
greater access to goods and customers that dealing also with strangers permits. 
By definition, the majority of ‘situational’ crime prevention strategies applied to
drug-dealing have relevance only to geographically fixed markets. However, it
should be noted that some tactics that can be described as situational - in the sense
that they fall under Clarke’s heading of ‘controlling facilitators’ of crime - can be
employed with respect to mobile markets. Most obviously (as discussed by
Natarajan et al, 1995), controls can be exerted over the use of telephones,
including mobile phones.
There are four major issues to be considered with regard to the situational policing
of drug markets: 
• the necessity of identifying and analysing drug hot-spots , as a first stage of any
locally-based preventive strategy; 
• the relevance of police crackdowns , or low-level enforcement, to situational
initiatives;
• the various strategies of place management which can be employed by the 
police, in partnership with other agencies, in order to modify the environments 
of drug-dealing sites;
• the potential problem of displacement: that is, the possibility that situational 
initiatives will produce changing patterns of, rather than net reductions in, 
crime. 
These four issues will be discussed in turn in the sections of the report that follow,
and will be illustrated with reference to case studies. It should be noted that
although a substantial amount of research on situational crime prevention in
general has been carried out in Britain, there is a limited amount of British material
on situational initiatives that have been applied to drug markets. In the USA, in
contrast, a number of evaluations of situational operations against drug-dealing
have been conducted; hence most of the case studies to be examined in this report
are American. An interesting and significant British case that will be considered
here, however, is that of Operation Welwyn at King’s Cross in London.
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2. Identifying and Analysing Drug Hot-Spots
Clearly, the successful implementation of situational strategies at drug markets 
depends, in the first place, upon thorough knowledge of the geographical locations
and spread of those markets. Some drug markets, especially if they operate at street
level and are long-established, may be in locations that are well-known to
offenders, the general public, and the police. In other cases, in contrast, the very
task of identifying major drug-dealing sites may require a fairly sophisticated level
of crime analysis. The process of mapping drug markets - like the mapping of other
kinds of crime hot-spots - can be greatly aided by current and rapid developments
in information technology. The data used for the purposes of analysis can derive
from many sources, including intelligence records, arrest and crime reports, public
complaints, emergency calls for service (as in Case 1, below), community meetings,
and public surveys.
CASE 1: Mapping drug markets in New Bedford, Massachusetts (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 1994)
As part of an assessment of a new crime analysis system known as the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), researchers working under the
auspices of the United States’ Bureau of Justice Statistics analysed a set of
automated, incident-based data on drug problems collected by the police
department of New Bedford, Massachusetts. The primary aim of the analysis was
to identify addresses at which there was repeated drug activity.
The data used in the analysis derived from the department’s computer-aided
despatch (CAD) system, and comprised details of all drug-related incidents in
the city from January to September 1990. Drug-related incidents were defined as
those where the dispatch was to a drug offence, the officer found drugs to be
involved in the incident to which he was despatched, or the call was for a drugs
raid. It was found that during the period in question, there was a total of 1,326
drug-related calls from 578 addresses.
Significantly, eight per cent of these addresses were the source of five or more
calls each, accounting for 42% of all incidents; further, four per cent of addresses
produced ten or more calls each, accounting for 31% of the total. These figures
strongly suggested that it was most cost-effective for proactive police strategies to
be targeted at that small minority of addresses responsible for the highest
number of calls. This conclusion seems clearer still if it is taken into account
that once any given address had produced five calls, the probability of there
being subsequent incidents at that location was as high as 0.87. 
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In considering possible means of disrupting drug activity at the problem
addresses, it would be inappropriate to treat those addresses as if they existed as
isolated sites. The analysis of the New Bedford data included an examination of
the geographical clusters of drug incidents, and it was discovered that drug
activity was most intense in three areas of the city. Knowledge of the positions of
these clusters should, again, assist the strategic planning of the police (for
example, two schools were located near one of the clusters: a fact which could
be of particular concern to law enforcement agencies). Such information could
also inform decisions made about the boundaries of tactical drugs units, as was
suggested by the chief of the New Bedford police department.
The analysis of drug-dealing locations prior to the development and introduction of
any preventive strategy should entail more than simply identifying the whereabouts
of the sites. All the key characteristics of a given market will have major
repercussions for the choice of strategy, and must be thoroughly examined. The
kind of site in which the market is located is perhaps the first factor that must be
considered - given that dealing can take place in sites as various as residential
properties, abandoned properties of one sort or another, open streets, pubs or bars,
restaurants, and so on. Most crucially, as far as those interested in situational
strategies are concerned (and as is illustrated by Case 2, below), the question of
which environmental features make the site appealing to buyers and sellers must be
addressed. Police strategists will also want to know which drugs are being dealt at
the site, and about the kinds of people who are buying and selling: whether or not
they are locals, for example, and to what extent they are known to each other.
CASE 2: An examination of crime in and around abandoned buildings in
Austin, Texas (Spelman, 1993)
Strategists interested in situational crime prevention techniques must address
the following question: what are the environmental characteristics of a given
crime hot-spot that attract criminals? In some cases, part of the answer to this
question may lie in the fact that the hot-spot is located in or near an abandoned
building which is a convenient ‘hang-out’ for offenders. Indeed, this applies to
some of the drug market locations analysed by Weisburd and Green (1994) (see
Case 3, below).
Spelman sought to test the hypothesis that abandoned buildings attract
criminals, including drug-dealers and others, by conducting a study of crime in a
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low-income neighbourhood in Austin, Texas. He compared crime rates in 35
‘case blocks’ containing one or more abandoned buildings (defined as residential
buildings that had been vacant for at least three months or for less than three
months but were already uninhabitable) with crime rates in 24 ‘control blocks’
that had no abandoned buildings but were otherwise similar to the case blocks. 
The data on crime rates used by Spelman were derived from records of police
calls for service (classified as violent calls, property calls, or drug calls) that
resulted in the dispatch of an officer and the creation of a crime report, and from
inspections of abandoned buildings for evidence of illegal activity. It was also
noted whether or not vacant buildings had been secured.
One of the findings of the research was that there was evidence of drug use in
19% of the abandoned buildings. Spelman suggests that these were safe places
for drug users and dealers, since activity was rarely visible from the street, and
offenders were unlikely to be interrupted by the police or others. On the broader
question of relative crime rates in the case and the control blocks, it was found
that the former had about twice as many drug and theft cases, and gave rise to
1.3 times as many violent calls. 
Whether or not the abandoned buildings in a block had been secured proved to
be a highly significant factor: when crime rates were compared between the
blocks containing unsecured vacant buildings (which numbered 16) and all
other blocks (that is, the 43 blocks that contained secured vacant buildings or
no vacant buildings), it was found that the crime ratios were 3.2 for drug calls,
1.8 for theft calls, and 2.0 for violent calls. An obvious conclusion to be drawn
from these findings is that the identification and securing of abandoned
buildings can play a major part in crime prevention. 
Another question to be considered in the analysis of drug market locations is
whether, where dealing takes place over an extended area, it is most appropriate to
treat this as a single site or several, smaller markets; this is one of the issues
discussed by Weisburd and Green (1994) (Case 3). What Green (1996) refers to as
the ‘temporal dimensions’ of drug activity at any given site should also be
examined: that is, it should be remembered that many of the routine activities
taking place at a drug market location will be legitimate, and that the illegitimate
activities are bound to occur at certain times rather than continuously. It is also
important to note the extent to which drug-dealing at a particular location is
associated with other forms of criminal activity (as is quite commonly the case),
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and whether any preventive strategies are therefore likely to have a disruptive
effect on crimes other than those which are drug-related.
CASE 3: Defining street-level drug markets in Jersey City, New Jersey
(Weisburd and Green, 1994)
Weisburd and Green were involved in the mapping of street-level drug markets
in Jersey City, New Jersey, as the first stage of an evaluation of a new
enforcement strategy called the Drug Market Analysis Program (DMAP). 
Information about drug market locations was gathered by means of an analysis of
police data on narcotics arrests from June to November 1990, a phone-in
(members of the public were requested to call the police anonymously to give
details of drug markets in their local areas), and a large-scale community survey.
It was found that some degree of drug activity was in evidence at 322 out of a
total of 4,404 street intersections and street segments in Jersey City.
In order to assist the police with the implementation of the DMAP system,
Weisburd and Green sought to identify, among the 322 street locations at which
there was drug-dealing, discrete areas which could be labelled as ‘drug-markets’.
Taking into account the fact that - as was reported by the police - dealers tended
to operate in fixed locations and to specialise in particular drugs, the researchers
drew boundaries around areas in which there was evidence of ongoing, similar
drug activity. A total of 107 drug markets were identified in this way; some of
which spanned several active street intersections and street segments, and others
of which were much smaller.
The characteristics of the drug markets were then examined. It was found that
almost a third were in Jersey City’s South District: an area with the largest
number of residents from low-income and ethnic minority groups. On the other
hand, about a quarter of the markets were located in the primarily white and
middle-class North District. Another finding was that a large number of the
South District market areas contained abandoned buildings and vacant lots.
Altogether, the results of Weisburd and Green’s mapping exercise illustrate the
importance of focusing enforcement strategies on specific geographical areas, and
of recognising the diversity of markets: for example, in terms of size, clientele,
drug type and physical features.
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3. Police Crackdowns
As has been noted above, an intensification of enforcement activity is frequently a
concomitant of situational crime prevention strategies at drug market locations. A
police ‘crackdown’ has been defined as ‘an abrupt increase in police activity,
especially proactive enforcement, which is intended to increase dramatically the
perceived and/or actual threat of apprehension for specific types of offenses in
certain places or situations, and so to produce a general deterrent effect’ (Worden et
al, 1994: 95). 
A crackdown aimed at drug markets can involve any combination of a number of
elements which inhibit drug transactions - and ultimately, it is hoped, drug use - by
increasing the risks of arrest and general inconvenience faced by buyers and sellers.
Enforcement strategies may include a period of covert surveillance and a series of
test-purchase operations leading to a high number of arrests; a later stage of the
crackdown may involve the introduction of a large and highly visible police
presence in the form of frequent patrols. Police raids of drug market locations are
another enforcement option: these are ‘visible and sometimes violent
demonstrations of police power’ (Dorn et al, 1992: 97). A similarly overt method is
the ‘sweep’, where police move through an area known to be heavily used by drug-
dealers in order to search for drugs (and maybe weapons) and carry out - often in a
predominantly unselective manner - large numbers of arrests.
Levels of drug-dealing at a given location may drop rapidly or even immediately
following the launch of a police crackdown. Edmunds et al (1996) found that drug
users at various street-level drug markets sites in London tended to be highly
sensitive to what they knew or perceived to be police activity. Forty-four per cent
of respondents reported that risk of apprehension was a key factor in their decisions
about which markets to use. Police enforcement tactics were a frequent topic of
discussion and rumour among the users. It appeared that perceptions of risk did not,
however, dissuade the users from seeking to buy drugs at all: an observation which
raises the problem of displacement, to be discussed below.
Since an increased police presence is almost invariably a feature of crackdowns, an
operation at a drug market site should ideally lead to a decline in other forms of
crime and a decline in fear of crime, in addition to inhibiting dealing activity. The
police crackdown is often presented and perceived as an effort on the part of the
police and law-abiding community to ‘take back the streets’: to ‘claim’ or even
‘liberate’ public spaces which have become the domain of drug-dealers and others
who threaten public order (Zimmer, 1990). Zimmer found, in his study of
Operation Pressure Point which targeted drug-dealers in one part of New York City
in the mid-1980s, that crackdowns can in this way make a contribution to the
gentrification of a formerly run-down area.
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However, problems can arise if the development and promotion of enforcement
strategies are informed by simplistic notions of a clear-cut distinction between the
needs and wishes of a respectable ‘community’, on the one hand, and the
disreputable intentions of a collection of local ‘undesirables’, on the other hand.
Writing about the police anti-drugs project in King’s Cross known as Operation
Welwyn (to be discussed further below), Lee (1996) questions the working
assumption made by the police that an external and transient problem population
could be easily distinguished from a local and stable population with relatively
homogeneous interests. 
In practice, the fact that there are bound to be conflicting interests and concerns
within any ‘community’ will have repercussions for public perceptions of police
strategies. For example, opposition may be voiced to police tactics such as raids or
sweeps that are believed to target disproportionately members of ethnic minorities
(Lee notes that, according to police statistics, over 60% of arrestees in King’s Cross
were black) or, more generally, to be over-aggressive and to infringe civil liberties.1
Any such opposition may hinder not only the implementation of crackdown
strategies, but also wider attempts to link enforcement with multi-agency,
situational initiatives which, as we shall see, are by their nature dependent upon
good relations between the police and other sectors of the local population. Even
when there is little overt opposition to police tactics, evident disunity within a
local community can inhibit the emergence of grass-roots neighbourhood
associations able to support enforcement efforts, as was found by Sviridoff and
Hillsman (1994) (Case 4). 
CASE 4: A multi-method study of the effects of New York City’s Tactical
Narcotics Teams (Sviridoff and Hillsman, 1994)
An evaluation of the community-level effects of the Tactical Narcotics Teams
(TNT) in three Brooklyn precincts was initiated in 1989. The TNT units were
developed by the New York City Police Department in order to carry out short-
term, intensive narcotics enforcement in designated areas. 
The TNT enforcement activity was mainly focused on street-level crack cocaine
markets, but some operations targeted interior dealing (for example in vacant
buildings and the lobbies of apartment blocks) and sellers of powdered cocaine
and heroin. TNT primarily employed buy-and-bust tactics with the aim of
generating rapid arrests, but also engaged in co-operation with agencies seeking
to improve the general social and physical conditions of the neighbourhoods in
which the drug markets were located.
1 See Popkin et al (1995) for an
account of the legal controversy
surrounding the implementation
of a drug elimination programme,
incorporating sweeps, in public
housing developments in Chicago.
The evaluation of the TNT operations sought to uncover their impact upon
levels of drug activity, drug-related property crime, and fear of crime. It
employed a quasi-experimental methodology, and involved a comparison of two
TNT areas with an area designated as a future TNT site. Information was
gathered before, during and after the implementation of TNT, by means of
household surveys, analyses of statistical record data, in-depth interviews with
community leaders, residents, and drug users and sellers, and operational analysis
of TNT.
The preliminary findings of the research, reported upon by Sviridoff and
Hillsman, suggested that the TNT operations had mixed results. In the first
target area, 1,000 arrests were made over a 90-day period, approximately half of
which involved felony-level drug sales, generally of crack. In this area, it
appeared that over the course of the enforcement period street-level dealing
generally became less visible, and was virtually shut down on one block.
However, there was evidence to suggest that a growth in drug activity occurred
in some locations, and that the overall volume of dealing remained steady
throughout the enforcement period. TNT thus seems to have primarily had an
impact upon patterns rather than quantity of dealing, with some markets moving
from the street to indoors, and certain locations experiencing an increase and
others a decline in drug activity.
Among the community leaders interviewed by the researchers, some scepticism
was voiced regarding the outcomes of the enforcement activities, although there
was support for TNT’s presence, tactics and goals. TNT did not appear to have
the effect of promoting community-based anti-drugs efforts; the community
leaders tended to explain this in terms of the general lack of local community
organisation and solidarity, and the existence of ethnic and economic conflict. 
As far as the police are concerned, the most pressing problem associated with
crackdowns on drug markets may be the fact that these are, by definition, highly
resource-intensive and therefore cannot be sustained over long periods of time. It
must always be borne in mind that any beneficial effects of a crackdown can fade
rapidly once the enforcement measures are scaled down (although in some cases
efforts are made, following crackdowns, to maintain a heightened police presence:
see, for example, Case 5). After all, just as dealers and users may respond swiftly to
a perceived increase in police activity, their response to a decrease in activity may
also be rapid. However, problems arising from the scaling-down of enforcement
POLICE CRACKDOWNS
11
activity can be at least partially overcome if the police and/or other agencies are
able to introduce a set of environmental crime prevention measures. Appropriate
and long-lasting modifications to the places at which dealing takes place should
have the effect of consolidating whatever positive results have been achieved by
short-term enforcement strategies. 
CASE 5: The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment (Weisburd and
Green, 1995)
Following the mapping of street-level drug markets in Jersey City, reported upon
by Weisburd and Green (1994) and discussed as Case 3, an experimental
evaluation of a new enforcement strategy was carried out.
Fifty-six ‘hot-spots’ of drug activity, identified by the mapping process, were
evenly divided between experimental and control cases. The new strategy, which
was applied to the experimental cases, required the assignment of specific
officers to specific hot-spots, and comprised three stages. First, officers collected
information about the hot-spots for which they were responsible by conducting
surveillance, meeting with local residents and business owners, and reviewing
the mapping data. Secondly, officers sought to shut down drug activity through
enforcement measures tailored to the characteristics of the specific sites. These
measures culminated in intensive crackdowns which usually lasted a few hours
but sometimes led to further actions over the following days. At the third stage,
officers made efforts to maintain the gains they had achieved, by increasing
levels of surveillance and police patrols.
The effectiveness of the strategy was measured by looking at the numbers of
emergency calls for service made at the hot-spot locations during the seven
months before and the seven months after implementation. Comparisons were
made with the numbers of calls over a similar period at the control sites, at
which enforcement continued to take the same arrest-oriented, unsystematic
form that it had done prior to the experiment.
With regard to narcotics calls, there was no initial evidence of a consistent
improvement at the experimental as compared to the control sites. However,
when calls from two-block catchment areas around the sites were compared, it
was found that the new strategy had a major impact. Calls from the
experimental catchment areas decreased from 1,184 to 1,037, while those from
the control catchment areas increased from 887 to 1,395. One possible
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explanation for the fact that a decrease in calls was observed in the experimental
catchment areas but not in the experimental sites themselves is that overall
narcotics activity (in both the hot-spots and their catchment areas) did decline,
but this improvement was masked in the hot-spots because the intervention also
had the effect of encouraging local people to report those incidents that did
occur.
The new strategy did not appear to have an effect upon emergency calls for
violent or property offences. With respect to calls for disorder, both the
experimental and control sites recorded an increase in the post-intervention
period, reflecting seasonal conditions. It was found that this increase was
significantly greater in the control sites (3,559 to 4,270 calls: an increase of
20%) than in the experimental sites (3,257 to 3,513 calls: an increase of 8%),
thereby demonstrating that the new strategy had a strong effect.
CASE 6: An assessment of the results of police raids on crack houses in
Kansas City (Sherman and Rogan, 1995)
Sherman and Rogan sought to assess the effectiveness of a series of police raids
on crack houses carried out by the Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) of Kansas City.
The broad aim of the raids was to reduce crime in the residential blocks within
which the crack houses were situated, since crack and other drug markets are
frequently associated with high levels of crime in their immediate environments.
As a highly visible enforcement strategy, the raids were intended to have a
general deterrent effect on crime and disorder, whether or not they produced
arrests. 
Typically, a raid on a crack house by the SNU followed the purchase of drugs by
an undercover police officer or an informant, and the issuing of a warrant. The
raid itself would be constituted by the serving of the warrant by a squad of
heavily armed officers who would enter the house by force, secure it, search it for
drugs and weapons, and bring most or all of those in the house to a police
station for questioning.
The evaluation by Sherman and Rogan took the form of a randomised,
controlled experiment, carried out from November 1991 to May 1992. Court-
authorised raids were conducted at sites on 98 blocks (the ‘experimental’
blocks), while a further 109 blocks were not subject to raids and were treated as
controls. The impact of the raids on levels of crime and disorder in the
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experimental blocks was measured by comparing the numbers of offence reports
and calls for service made during the 30-day period prior to the raids with those
made over the 30 days following the raids. The numbers of calls for service and
offence reports emanating from the control blocks over a similar period were also
calculated. 
Over the course of the evaluation period, a decline in crime rates was evident in
both the control and experimental blocks, but in the latter cases the decline was
steeper. Taking the control group into account, the net reduction in calls for
service from the experimental blocks was eight per cent, and the net reduction
in offence rates fourteen per cent. Sherman and Rogan warn, however, that this
apparent success of the SNU strategy was modest, given the large investment of
officers’ time that it demanded. Moreover, when the daily impact of the raids
was measured, it was found that the deterrent effects decayed very quickly:
indeed, within two weeks of the raids, the effects had virtually disappeared. 
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4. Place Management
The defining element of situational crime prevention is its focus on the
modification of the environments within which crime is carried out. The
development and implementation of environmental measures at drug-dealing
locations is carried out most effectively when the police cooperate with other
agencies working in the local areas. These other agencies, which can be described
as ‘place managers’, include housing authorities, housing associations, landlords,
residents’ and tenants’ associations, local authority departments, local businesses,
and planning authorities.
The recognition of the importance of multi-agency work as a facet of crime
prevention at drug market locations reflects a wider emphasis on ‘partnership’
within the Government strategy on drugs. The 1995 White Paper Tackling Drugs
Together, as its very title implies, had partnership as one of its central themes. A
key initiative launched by the White Paper was the establishment of multi-agency
Drug Action Teams with responsibility for co-ordinating action against drugs at a
local level. The new Government anti-drugs strategy Tackling Drugs to Build a
Better Britain (1998) further strengthens the role of Drug Action Teams and
again stresses that it is only through partnership that progress can be made towards
realising its four aims of helping young people to resist drug misuse, protecting
communities from anti-social and criminal behaviour, providing services to enable
people to overcome their problems, and stifling the availability of drugs.
In devising environmental measures for the disruption of place-specific drug
markets, the police and their partners must address three fundamental and inter-
linked questions about the sites in question: 
1. What are the social and physical characteristics of the drug market locations 
that make them attractive to those who buy and sell drugs?
2. How can those ‘attractive’ characteristics be modified or eradicated?
3. What social and physical characteristics can be introduced in order to make the
locations unattractive to buyers and sellers?
The kinds of answers that will be put forward to these questions are dependent, first
of all, on the basic parameters of the drug markets in question: on whether they are
situated in open-air locations (such as streets or parks), abandoned buildings
(which may be in residential or non-residential blocks), private homes (which may
be owner-occupied or, alternatively, rented from private landlords, housing
associations, or local authorities), commercial premises (for example, pubs,
restaurants, night-clubs), or lobbies and other common areas of public housing
estates or other building complexes. 
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Places can have four key features which, singly or in any combination, invite drug-
dealing:
• lack of surveillance;
• weak management;
• the presence of potential customers;
• the presence of facilitators for buying and using drugs.
Below, I shall discuss some of the practical measures that can be taken in order to
modify or counter the effects of each of these features. This discussion will be
followed by the presentation of three case studies which illustrate the application of
multi-agency, environmental strategies at drug market locations. The chapter will
conclude with a consideration of some general issues relating to multi-agency
interventions.
Surveillance
Drug markets in public places of various kinds may flourish when there is little or
no surveillance: that is, when the buying and selling of drugs is not visible or
noticeable to individuals who are not participants in the transactions. Surveillance
can take different forms, including formal surveillance conducted by the police or
security guards. The introduction of CCTV and/or regular patrols by police or
security personnel are the most straightforward means of enhancing formal
surveillance and thereby increasing the risks of apprehension perceived by dealers
and users. As noted above, these strategies are frequently employed as elements of
locally-based enforcement operations against drug markets.
Informal surveillance is carried out by employees who do not have a specific
security role at the premises at which they work, but may nevertheless be on the
look-out for drug-dealing, drug-taking or other illegal activities taking place.
Caretakers, restaurant staff, park attendants and so on can be trained to spot
suspicious behaviour, and either to take measures to prevent it themselves, or to
inform security guards or the police.
Natural surveillance occurs when members of the general public who are simply
going about their day-to-day business take note of any criminal or potentially
criminal behaviour of individuals they come across. There will be a lack of natural
surveillance at a public place which is poorly-lit, obscured by barriers of one kind or
another, or perhaps simply tucked away. Places that are perceived as dirty or
dangerous may likewise be subject to little natural surveillance, as law-abiding
individuals may be inclined to stay away from them. Conversely, surveillance by
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the general public may also be inhibited at places which are especially busy: if a
great deal of activity of all kinds is occurring at a particular location, suspicious
behaviour may fail to attract attention.
A wide range of measures can be taken to increase effective natural surveillance at
public places used by drug dealers. Improving lighting, cleaning up rubbish,
removing abandoned cars, and regulating parking, for example, can all play a part
in making open-air sites more conspicuous or accessible to the wider public and
consequently less attractive to dealers (see the 1993 Bureau of Justice Assistance
report for some examples of ‘problem-oriented policing’ in several American cities
which encompassed these kinds of tactics). Knuttson (1997) describes the case of a
successful police crackdown on drug use and dealing in a public park in Stockholm,
Sweden, which coincided with efforts made by the park authorities to enhance
natural surveillance. Thus, hedges were trimmed around the part of the park at
which drug activity was most common, and a ‘dog toilet’ was introduced in order to
encourage legitimate park users to frequent the area.
Natural surveillance will have little deterrent effect on drug-dealing when dealers
believe that members of the general public are unlikely to take steps (either
directly or via enforcement agencies) to prevent it, even if they notice that it is
taking place. Such apparent lack of concern might be a result of intimidation of
ordinary people by local criminals, a widespread sense that nothing can be done
about high rates of crime, including drug-dealing, at the location in question, or a
generalised resentment towards or mistrust of the police. A number of academics in
the United States have argued that poor design of public housing can contribute to
residents’ feelings of helplessness or apathy with regard to crime. Among the
suggestions made are that public housing residents are more inclined to feel a sense
of solidarity with one another and to be intolerant of crime committed near their
homes if they are housed in relatively small-scale complexes, with few and
overlooked points of access, and extensive neighbourhood facilities.2
Management
When drug-dealing occurs in private homes and abandoned buildings, this may
partially be a consequence of weak management of the properties. Drug activity
may be (unwittingly) encouraged by property owners who - whether they are public
housing authorities, housing associations, or private individuals or agencies - fail to
secure abandoned buildings, or do not seek to exercise control over criminal
behaviour among their tenants. Properties which are losing value or are
encumbered with debt may be particularly prone to use by drug-dealers, since in
these cases landlords may simply not have the financial capacity to take action
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2 The concepts of ‘crime
prevention through environmental
design’ (Jeffery, 1977) and
‘defensible space’ (Newman,
1972) have been particularly
influential within this field of
research.
against offenders (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). By screening potential tenants,
evicting tenants who are known to be drug dealers, liaising with police engaged in
local enforcement efforts, and renovating or at least securing empty premises,
landlords can take steps to inhibit dealing at their properties.
Weak management may also be a feature of bars, fast-food restaurants, and night-
clubs in which drug-dealing and using is taking place. This may simply be a matter
of a failure on the part of staff to carry out informal surveillance; or, more seriously,
corrupt staff may actually facilitate or promote dealing at their premises. Morris
(1998) has highlighted ways in which some doormen at dance venues in the UK
are involved in drug-dealing at the premises they are charged to protect. This
involvement takes various forms: doormen may turn a blind eye to dealing activity,
perhaps as a result of intimidation; or they may receive payment from dealers in
return for allowing dealing to take place; or they may act as primary dealers
themselves. Problems arising from poor management at commercial premises can be
resolved through close supervision and training of staff, liaison with the police, and
increased awareness of the forms and extent of local drug activity.
Customers
Drug markets may be located at places where pools of likely customers already exist.
For example, street-level markets frequently emerge in areas known for
prostitution, since many prostitutes are heavy drug-users. Edmunds et al (1996)
found that prostitution was well-established at - and probably pre-dated - four of six
drug markets they examined in London. The relationship between drug-dealing and
prostitution is likely to be complex: drug markets can promote prostitution and vice
versa, or both can arise simultaneously as a result of certain environmental factors.
The association between drug activity and prostitution suggests that police and
local authorities’ efforts to disrupt the one should also have an effect on the other.
The introduction of high-visibility police patrols, for instance, may inhibit both
drug and sex-work activity; and efforts to close down hotels frequented by
prostitutes and their clients, and block off streets used by kerb-crawlers, may have a
knock-on effect on drug markets.3
Edmunds et al (1996) also point out that drug dealers may benefit from housing and
planning policies which have the effect of bringing together large numbers of
individuals likely to be already involved in, or susceptible to the temptations of,
the local drug scene. Where possible, temporary accommodation such as hostels
and bed-and-breakfasts should not be located at or near places associated with
drug-dealing. Similarly, housing associations should do their best to avoid housing
vulnerable tenants in such areas. Careful thought should also be given to the
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3 For detailed discussion of the
links between sex and drug
markets, and the potential
benefits of integrating the policing
of both, see May et al
(forthcoming).
locations of such facilities as needle exchanges, health services and prescribing
chemists. Planning decisions should also take account of the fact that drug
nuisance places are frequently found near to bars and off-licences (Green, 1996).
The emergence of the ‘dance drug’ scene within contemporary youth culture has
produced many new and lucrative sites for drug-dealing. It has already been noted,
above, that dealing at dance venues - which include night-clubs, pubs with dance
floors, and large warehouses - is sometimes even carried out with the willing or
unwilling support of door supervisors. In the case of drug-dealing at dance venues,
enforcement and preventive strategies can hardly aim at the dispersal of the
customer base - except when unlicensed ‘raves’ held in warehouses or the open air
are deemed illegal and are broken up by the police. Otherwise, effective prevention
is, as we have seen, largely dependent on strong management, which is encouraged
by the recently introduced powers contained in the Public Entertainment Licences
(Drugs Misuse) Act 1997. This allows licensing authorities to close down a club
immediately when there is a serious problem of drug misuse.
Drug markets situated at street locations or in public areas of building complexes
will operate only if there is good access to them: users and dealers must be able to
get to and away from the sites easily and quickly. Thus access control is sometimes
a component of situational prevention: for example, walk-ways on housing estates
may be blocked off. However, the issue of access is not easy to address: inaccessible
locations may attract dealers because of the lack of natural surveillance; and
enforcement efforts by the police can be hindered if there is limited access to a
drug-dealing site. One small element of a problem-oriented policing strategy
implemented against drug-dealers in two public housing communities in Atlanta,
Georgia, was the removal of clothes lines which had been strung between buildings
at shin and neck height in order to trip police officers in pursuit of offenders
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993). 
Facilitators
The control or removal of facilitators of crime is often regarded as an important
part of situational crime prevention. With regard to drug markets, however, there
are not a great many facilitators to be considered; the telephone is perhaps the
most obvious of those that do exist. When deals are arranged over public
telephones, these may be removed, or positioned within direct view of place
managers. Alternatively, calls can be monitored, and incoming calls barred.
Cash is another crucial facilitator for drugs transactions: hence markets may be
located near to bank cash-points or to post offices at which Giro cheques can be
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cashed. It is unlikely that such facilities would be shut down as part of a preventive
strategy. A measure that is more easily contemplated is the location of cash-points
within lobbies which have controlled access, since this can reduce opportunities for
theft of cash (Edmunds et al, 1996); however, there is a risk that individuals
withdrawing money may be intimidated inside lobbies.
Drug markets may be situated at places where there is ready access to equipment for
drug use - such as syringes, citric acid or lemons, water, and foil. In many cases
little can be done to limit access to the most basic equipment; but restaurants and
bars commonly used as meeting sites may be advised to avoid the use of foil
ashtrays, and, as has already been suggested, the locations of needle exchanges
require careful consideration. As Edmunds et al(1996) point out, efforts to reduce
availability of drug equipment can have negative repercussions for the health of
users: a lack of syringes can lead to the sharing of needles, and when citric acid
cannot be obtained, lemons may be used as a more dangerous substitute.
CASE 7: The Specialized Multi-Agency Response Team in Oakland,
California (Green, 1996)
The Specialized Multi-Agency Response Team (SMART) approach was set up
by the Oakland Police Department in 1988. SMART officers target places -
including both business and residential premises - at which drug or general
disorder problems have given rise to emergency calls for service, narcotics
arrests, or specific requests for SMART intervention from community groups. 
SMART officers employ a range of tactics. Typically, the first stage of
intervention is a visit to the site in question, where officers set up a working
relationship with local residents, landlords and business-owners in order to raise
awareness of the issues of concern, promote confidence in the police, and
encourage reporting of problems. SMART interventions frequently involve the
implementation of environmental crime prevention strategies: landlords may be
requested to remove graffiti and refuse; and planning authorities may be asked to
erect street barriers to disrupt traffic. SMART officers offer a landlord training
programme, which covers issues such as tenant screening. A key component of
most interventions is the site visit by a team of city agency representatives -
which can include, for example, officers from the housing, fire, and public works
departments - who will enforce city regulations. Where there seem to be
intractable problems at a site, officers will use civil law in requiring property-
owners to take action against offenders: landlords can themselves be fined, have
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their properties closed down, or be forced to sell their properties if drug use is
taking place. If appropriate, traditional law enforcement measures, including
surveillance and arrests, are also carried out as part of SMART interventions.
Green’s evaluation of the Oakland SMART programme examined the impact of
interventions at all 321 locations targeted in 1991. There were two parts to the
study. First, the numbers of narcotics arrests, emergency calls, and field contacts
(i.e. cautions) made at the sites prior to intervention, during a six-month
intervention period, and during a six-month post-intervention period were
calculated, and compared with the monthly averages for arrests, calls and
contacts across the city. Secondly, changes in the appearances of the targeted
sites were assessed: photographs were taken of the exteriors and interiors of the
buildings before and after intervention, and were rated according to whether
there was evidence of general improvement. The findings of the study were
encouraging. Between the pre- and post-intervention periods, narcotics arrests
per month declined by 34%, field contacts by 59% and emergency calls by 4%;
the equivalent figures for the city as a whole were a decline of 19%, a decline of
21%, and a rise of 10% respectively. Of the 321 sites, 123 showed evidence of
improved internal physical appearance, compared to 32 which had deteriorated;
the figures for external appearance were 119 and 25 respectively.
As the SMART locations were highly heterogeneous in terms of the problems
associated with and tactics employed against them, Green also analysed the
relative impact of several different features of the interventions. Among her
findings were that the greatest improvements were made when traditional
enforcement strategies were employed in combination with alternative
strategies; and that SMART interventions were most effective at highly visible
business premises - presumably because business owners had the most to lose by
not co-operating with police efforts to solve problems.
CASE 8: A study of the Community Oriented Problem Solving initiative in
St Louis, Missouri (Hope, 1994)
Hope presents three case studies of problem-oriented policing which were part of
a study of the ‘Community Oriented Problem Solving’ (COPS) initiative,
launched in St Louis in 1991. In each of the three cases, police activity aimed to
reduce general levels of crime and disorder at locations associated with drug-
dealing, and was primarily focused on a specific problem address. In order to
assess the impact of the strategy, the numbers of calls for police service to the
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address, the block in which it was situated, and the surrounding area were
analysed over three periods (spanning June 1990 to August 1992): the twelve
months prior to special police activity, the nine-month period of intervention,
and the six-month post-intervention period.
The policing initiatives involved various combinations of a number of elements,
among which were the following:
• increased enforcement against drug activity (in one case, this was part of a 
‘zero tolerance’ approach to all forms of criminal and disruptive behaviour);
• liaison with the local community, for example through convening meetings at 
which residents’ concerns could be aired, and supporting a neighbourhood
association’s series of anti-drugs rallies;
• arranging for the appropriate city agencies to clear up rubbish outside run-
down properties, and to board up vacant buildings;
• liaison with social workers who were able to relocate certain tenants living in 
problem properties;
• co-ordination with a landlord who was encouraged to evict a tenant known to
be involved in drug-dealing, and to sell the property to a responsible 
developer;
• liaison with a finance company with which a mortgage on a problem property 
was held, with the result that the property’s owner-occupier was persuaded to 
leave the property voluntarily.
In two of the cases, several of the above actions involved close co-operation
with the area’s designated ‘ConServ Officer’: a city official with responsibility for
working with local residents on the delivery of city services, neighbourhood
planning, and housing development.
The outcome of the police activity was found to be generally positive. In all
three cases, there was an increase in numbers of calls for police service to the
problem addresses during the intervention period - seemingly reflecting a greater
willingness on the part of the public to make calls when they were aware of
heightened police activity. In the follow-up period, all three addresses
experienced a sharp decline in police calls: most strikingly, in one case a total of
88 calls was recorded for six months of the intervention period, and no more
than three over the following six months. In two of the cases, a decline (in one
case, of 70%) in calls to the remainder of the block in the post-intervention
period was also recorded; furthermore, the declines in calls to the blocks were
found to be exceptional when compared to call trends in surrounding areas. In
the other case, however, calls to the remainder of the block increased by over
200% in the post-intervention period, suggesting that the police strategy had
had the effect of shifting rather than eliminating local drug activity.
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CASE 9: Operation Welwyn in King’s Cross, London (Lee, 1996; Perera et
al, 1996)
King’s Cross, situated just to the north of central London, is an economically
deprived area, at the heart of which is a large main-line railway station. Much of
King’s Cross is non-residential - containing, for example, large numbers of fast-
food restaurants - and there is a substantial amount of temporary
accommodation in the area. Since the mid-nineteenth century King’s Cross has
been associated with prostitution; and from the early 1990s it also gained a
reputation as a site of street-level drug-dealing, with heroin and crack being the
major drugs sold and used. 
Operation Welwyn was launched in 1991 by the Metropolitan Police Service as
an enforcement-oriented response to the local drugs and related problems. Over
the course of Phases I and II of the Operation, in late 1991 and early 1992, 174
suspected dealers and buyers were arrested (Lee, 1996). However, among both
local residents and the police there was a widespread sense that any gains in
terms of general crime reduction were short-term, and that the underlying
problems of the area required a more broadly based response. Hence late 1992
saw the establishment of the King’s Cross Partnership, involving the police
(Phase III of Operation Welwyn was to be the police input into the initiative),
Camden and Islington Health Authority, Camden and Islington Councils,
Islington Safer Cities Project, voluntary organisations, and businesses. The
police described their aim, within the partnership, as being: ‘to improve the
quality of life for the residents, commuters and people who work in, or pass
through, the King’s Cross area by reducing crime (drugs, prostitution and
associated criminality), and reducing the fear of crime’. The King’s Cross
Partnership, and Operation Welwyn, continue to operate at the time of writing.
Some of the partnership activities to which the police have contributed are the
evictions of tenants involved in drug-dealing; the limiting of opening hours of
fast-food outlets (in order to break the 24-hour cycle of street activity); the
launch of a free newspaper providing information on local developments; the
‘designing out’ of places at which drug-dealing and using could take place (for
example by sealing off alleys and railway arches, boarding up derelict buildings,
constructing fences, and removing bus shelters); the improvement of refuse
collection and street lighting; the organisation of a new service for clearing up
discarded syringes; and the local councils’ application for the Government’s
Single Regeneration Bid.
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Vigorous enforcement has accompanied the police involvement in the above
kinds of preventive activities; as in the earlier phases of Operation Welwyn, this
has entailed targeting, intelligence gathering and surveillance, together with
high-visibility patrolling. According to police statistics, 2,000 individuals were
arrested or cautioned between 1993 and 1994 for various illegal activities; within
the same period, a total of 4,000 stop and searches were recorded (Lee, 1996).
There continues to be concern among the police, however, about the short-term
impact of their enforcement measures; and interviews with dealers and users
likewise indicate that the disruption caused to drug-dealing tends to be
temporary, especially since the supply of drugs to the area has hardly been
affected (Perera et al, 1996). No full evaluation of the impact of Operation
Welwyn has to date been conducted; but Lee concludes on the basis of research
she conducted on the initiative that its achievements have been ‘more apparent
in stimulating social and environmental improvements in a deprived area rather
than in containing the drug trade in King’s Cross’ (1996: 49). 
Conclusion
Cases 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the very wide scope of multi-agency crime prevention at
drug market locations. Table 2, below, summarises the major elements of
partnership work in this field.
Many partnership initiatives at drug-dealing sites can be described as examples of
‘third-party policing’: this term refers to situations where the police persuade or
coerce non-offending parties (such as property or business owners) to take measures
to prevent or disrupt criminal behaviour. Successful prevention or disruption
frequently depends upon the third parties’ use of civil law to impose non-criminal
penalties on offenders. Such penalties may be more quickly imposed, and with
more direct consequences, than criminal penalties (Green, 1996). This kind of civil
enforcement was employed as part of an anti-drugs strategy applied to the Kinglake
housing estate in Southwark, south London (reported upon by Lee, 1995). Here,
the local council, in conjunction with the police, used civil injunctions to evict
tenants known to be involved in drug-dealing, and also to exclude from the estate
non-resident drug-dealers. Civil enforcement was also a major feature of many of
the SMART interventions described by Green (1996) (Case 7).
The expansion of third-party policing of this kind exemplifies the increasing
complexity of the ‘policing division of labour’, to which Lee (1995) has drawn
attention. One further aspect of the new division of labour has been a rapid rise in
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the use of private security companies for crime control. As public demand for
visible policing intensifies, and resource constraints make it ever more difficult for
forces to meet that demand, growing numbers of private firms are being employed
to carry out patrols and surveillance in semi-public areas such as housing estates. 
Notions of ‘community’ are central to much strategic thinking about multi-agency
work at drug market locations. The very idea of partnership presupposes that the
police, local residents and local organisations have (at least some) shared aims, and
can therefore work together in seeking to achieve them. A general concern with
the interests and priorities of communities is reflected, Lee notes, in the
restructuring of the police service which followed the 1993 White Paper on Police
Refor m, a major element of which has been ‘to devolve routine policing to self-
contained local command units, focus managerial power on the division, and,
theoretically, make it responsive to local communities’ needs’ (1995: 385). A focus
on communities is apparent in both the previous and the new Government drugs
strategies: one of the key aims of the former was ‘to increase the safety of
communities from drug-related crime’, and, of the latter, ‘to protect our
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Table 2  Multi-Agency Inititives Against Local Drug Markets
Police partners
Housing authorities
Housing associations
Landlords
Owners/managers of 
leisure facilities,
pubs and restaurants
Planning authorities
Health authorities
General public
Tenants’/residents’  
associations
Actions
Board up or renovate vacant properties
Clean up litter and graffiti
Control residents’/tenants’ behaviour (e.g. through evictions, tenant
screening)
Block off hidden alleys and corners within housing estates
Limit access to housing estates
Alert staff to possibility of drug activity
Train staff in dealing with drug activity (e.g. through citizen’s
arrests, notifying the police)
Design premises so as to inhibit dealing and using (e.g. keep all
activities within view of the staff; install CCTV in toilets)
Locate health services, needle exchanges, temporary
accommodation away from areas associated with drug-dealing
Erect street barriers to disrupt vehicular traffic
Regulate parking
Improve lighting
Install CCTV
Conduct research on perceptions of local drug problems
Convene meetings for discussion of problems and possible responses
Co-opt representatives from community organisations on to
decision-making bodies 
Organise ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ schemes
communities from drug-related anti-social and criminal behaviour’. However, as
was noted above in the discussion of police crackdowns, it can by no means be
assumed that within any area there will be a unified, community response to drugs
problems. The success of any multi-agency initiative will always partially depend
upon its sensitivity to the social and economic divisions and tensions that exist
within the neighbourhood.
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5. Displacement
The problem of displacement is a matter of concern to those who promote
situational crime prevention of any kind. Displacement occurs when enforcement
or prevention initiatives have the effect of shifting crime from one place to
another, or persuading offenders to engage in alternative modes of criminal
behaviour. A situational crime prevention initiative at a drug market location
results in displacement if the dealers move to another site, alter the times at which
they deal, change their mode of operation (for example, from dealing at fixed,
street-level sites to arranging transactions and deliveries over the telephone), or
even take up new, similarly criminal money-making ventures. Any situational
strategy that produces close to 100% displacement might be considered of little
value, since the level of total crime within the community will have remained
more-or-less constant. Hence the measurement of displacement is often seen as a
crucial element of crime prevention evaluations. 
However, the task of measuring displacement is fraught with difficulty, since the
forms that displaced criminal activity can take are so various. Furthermore, even
when a particular strategy is known to cause displacement, assessing the overall
effects of that displacement is by no means straightforward. 
For example, where rates of crime fall in a high-crime area and simultaneously rise
in a traditionally low-crime area, some have argued that there is a net benefit to
society from this more ‘equitable’ distribution of crime (Clarke, 1997). And where
preventive strategies lead offenders to undertake new forms of criminal activity that
are ultimately less profitable than those in which they previously engaged, this may
lead, in the long term, to a fall in crime. Some preventive strategies have been
found to lead to a reverse process to that of displacement: a ‘diffusion of benefits’
occurs when the beneficial effects of a strategy have an impact upon an area or a
form of crime that was not directly targeted. 
The complexities of the subject notwithstanding, it remains important that any
consideration of the value of situational crime prevention takes account of the
potential for, and possible nature of, displacement and diffusion effects.
There is some discussion of the subject of displacement in several of the case
studies that have been presented above. Relevant findings are:
• The Tactical Narcotics Teams in New York (Case 4) appeared to shift the sites 
of drug-dealing rather than eradicate them: a decrease in drug activity at certain
places was accompanied by an increase at others, and some markets moved from
street-level to indoor locations. 
• The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment (Case 5) found that 
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intensive enforcement at a number of hot-spots of drug activity led to a decline 
in narcotics-related emergency calls for service in two-block catchment areas 
around the sites. The final stage of the research involved a replication of the 
mapping procedure by which the drug hot-spots had originally been identified: 
this showed that a certain amount of new drug activity had emerged in the 
post-intervention period, suggesting that there had been some displacement. 
However, this new activity was not extensive, and it was impossible to assess 
how much of it was linked to the experimental strategy.
• Sherman and Rogan’s assessment (1995) of police raids on crack houses in 
Kansas City (Case 6) found evidence of a diffusion of benefits: the raids 
appeared to reduce general levels of crime in the residential blocks in which the
crack houses were situated. However, the declines in crime rates were limited, 
and the effects of the raids decayed rapidly.
• One of the findings of Green’s assessment (1996) of Oakland’s SMART
programme (Case 7) was that in the post-intervention period there were
declines in narcotics arrests and field contacts in over 75% of two-block 
catchment areas around the sites targeted by multi-agency action. In only six 
per cent of cases was there evidence of displacement: in these cases, 
improvement at the SMART locations was accompanied by deterioration in the
catchment areas.
• The multi-agency Community Oriented Problem Solving initiative in St Louis 
(Case 8) had mixed results as far as displacement is concerned. In one of the 
cases examined by Hope (1994), the targeting of a problem address led to an 
increase in crime in the remainder of the block, while in the two other cases, 
there was a diffusion of benefits, as crime fell both at the problem addresses and 
in the whole blocks.
• There is some evidence that drug-dealers have countered Operation Welwyn 
(Case 9) by moving to sites outside King’s Cross, including Earl’s Court and 
nearby Euston Station, and operating in a more covert fashion within King’s
Cross. Perera et al(1996) found that some local residents were experiencing 
new problems as a result of the movement of drug activity from the streets into 
housing estates. 
It is difficult to reach general conclusions about the risks of displacement from the
cases outlined above since not only are the situations and policing strategies they
describe highly variable, but there is also much variety in the ways in which the
researchers have conceptualised and sought to measure displacement. For example,
in Cases 6 and 8 the analyses of displacement/diffusion effects were highly
localised: that is, the researchers were primarily concerned with the relationship
between changing levels of crime at particular addresses and changes at the blocks
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in which the addresses were located. In other cases, in contrast, the analyses were
somewhat broader in scope.
Nevertheless, when one considers the findings of the case studies as a whole, and
the wider literature on displacement, four key points become apparent:
1. Risks of displacement will rarely be so great as to invalidate entirely situational 
initiatives at drug-dealing sites. In many cases, displacement may occur to a 
limited extent only; and even when it does occur its effects may be at least 
partially off-set by a diffusion of benefits.
2. The most likely form of displacement arising from low-level enforcement and 
surveillance is the transformation of open markets into closed ones. Changing 
technology - such as the increasing availability of mobile phones - can facilitate
this process. 
3. Displacement may have certain benign effects: for example, a shift from overt to
covert drug-dealing can make it difficult for novice users to gain access to a 
market, and should lead to a reduction in forms of anti-social behaviour 
associated with street-level markets. (However, it is important to remember 
Perera et al’s observation [1996] that in King’s Cross the movement of dealers 
into housing estates caused its own problems for residents.)
4. It is clear that there is much need for further research to be carried out on the 
subject of displacement. Evaluations of situational initiatives should always 
encompass analyses of displacement and diffusion effects; ideally, such analyses 
should be conducted over the long term, since the effects of any operation are
likely to be modified in one way or another over time.
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6. Conclusion
This report has considered what can be learnt from existing studies, and
particularly US evaluations, of situational crime prevention initiatives at drug hot-
spots. The potential benefits - and potential difficulties - associated with these
kinds of initiatives are likely to receive increasing attention in the UK, given that
the new Government strategy on drugs emphasises both the importance of
community-level, partnership approaches to tackling drug problems, and the need
to target and disrupt drug-dealing at a local level.
From the findings of the studies reviewed by this report, it can be concluded that
there are six crucial elements to successful multi-agency, preventive initiatives
against local drug markets:
• Appropriateness of intervention Analysis of a drug market site, prior to the 
design of a preventive strategy, should entail careful examination of the 
parameters and nature of the local problem, and the environmental features of 
the location. Consultation with residents and community groups can enhance 
sensitivity to any unique features of the site, and should further ensure that the 
intervention is tailored to the specific needs of the situation.
• Intensity of intervention The use of proactive enforcement tactics in 
combination with alternative methods of crime prevention permits the 
weaknesses of certain approaches to be counter-acted by the strengths of others.
A willingness to consider, without prejudice, the full range of options available 
to the police and other agencies is thus often a feature of successful initiatives.
• Leverage Situational policing of drug markets requires the creative use of levers 
by the police as they seek to persuade other agencies to work with them. In 
some cases, this will primarily be a matter of encouraging potential partners to 
recognise that they have common interests and goals. In other cases, the police 
may have to draw on civil laws and regulations in obliging place managers to 
take actions against drug dealers and users. 
• Sustained action The likelihood that the beneficial impact of many initiatives 
will be eroded over time must always be borne in mind. Preventive strategies 
should incorporate components that will have at least some long-term effects 
upon drug market sites, and should be sufficiently flexible to respond to 
changing patterns of behaviour among drug dealers and users.
• Sensitivity to community relations Crime control initiatives that exacerbate 
existing tensions within neighbourhoods may be counter-productive. When 
local residents and community organisations are involved in the development of
strategies, efforts should be made to incorporate representatives of as many 
segments of the population as possible.
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• Evaluation Thorough process evaluations of initiatives should bring to light 
design and implementation problems as and when they arise, and may therefore
assist with their resolution. Evaluations should also allow early mistakes to be 
avoided and achievements to be built upon in later phases of operations, and 
facilitate interchange concerning good practice between agencies and regions.
The task of deterring localised drug-dealing is, clearly, only one of many drug-
related objectives that any police force will be concerned with. However, it is to be
hoped that this report has gone some way towards highlighting the significance of
this particular task, and some of the most effective means by which it can be
approached.
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